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Abstract 
This paper proposes that the gas economics in East Asia (including Southeast Asia and Northeast 
Asia)  is different from standard economics due to its exogenous oil-indexed pricing and certain 
region-specific and industry-specific factors. Based on a hypothesis of distinctive economics, 
this paper proposes an analytical framework that studies East Asian gas markets. We 
demonstrate this framework through a case study of the effects of a low oil prices. The 
qualitative and quantitative results demonstrate that low oil prices, and subsequent gas prices, 
have affected gas supply and demand, and trade and pricing dynamics in ways that can be 
explained by the distinctive gas economics. This paper demonstrates that the distinctive 
economics may cause market failure and that the analytical framework based on the distinctive 
economics can be used to assess policy options that can address these market failures.  





The global market in liquefied natural gas (LNG) is undergoing seismic changes: markets are 
more globally integrating, gas and LNG pricing mechanisms and business practice in relation to 
contractual terms are changing, and unbalanced supply and demand in the past few years. The 
low oil prices in the past years add further complication to those changes. Over the past two 
years, oil prices have declined more than 70%—with Brent benchmarks dipping from US$110 in 
June 2014 to below US$30 a barrel in early 2016, and remaining at approximately US$50 for 
most of 2016.  
In this context, studying the effect of oil prices on natural gas in East Asia (including Southeast 
Asian and Northeast Asia) is important for East Asian and world gas markets for three principal 
reasons. First, the expected prolonged period of low oil prices has affected global gas markets 
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Studies have observed independent short-
term fluctuation in gas prices with long-term interdependence (co-integrated processes) with oil 
prices [1-4]. Ramberg [2] found a statistically significant relationship between oil and gas prices 
in the short and long terms. According to Hartley et al [4], oil and gas prices can decouple in the 
short term but the long-term dependence is hypothesised to continue due to technology 
interdependence. Even in the United Kingdom (UK) where gas prices are generated by hub, there 
is long-term relationship between oil prices and spot gas prices [5].   
Second, fluctuations in the oil prices have a particularly significant effect on natural gas in East 
Asia because the region’s imported gas and LNG are traded under oil-indexed contracts. The oil-
indexed gas trade (both LNG and pipeline) in East Asia as a percentage of the region’s total gas 
trade reached 88% in 2014, which is a great deal higher than the global average of 65% [6]. East 
Asia’s natural-gas spot prices have declined along with oil prices, although with some time lag. 
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In October 2016, Japan’s LNG import Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) price was less than 
US$6 per MMBTU, which was down from more than US$16/MMBTU in June 2016 [7]. The 
LNG spot prices then went to even lower levels. On 18 April 2016, the free-on-board Singapore 
Exchange (SGX) LNG Index Group (SLInG) prices for June 2016 fell below US$4 per MMBTU 
[8]. 
Third, East Asia is a critical player in the global gas and LNG markets. East Asia possesses the 
world’s fastest growth rate in natural-gas demand in recent years—a trend that is expected to 
continue in until 2035[9]. Given that gas accounted for only 5% and 9% of the 2013 total 
primary energy supply in China and India, respectively, the demand of these countries for natural 
gas is expected to surge due to increasing pressure from their citizens to reduce air pollution 
immediately and mitigate climate change and coal emissions in the long term [10]. According to 
BP [11], East Asia’s share of the global gas market is expected to increase from 18.8% in 2012 
to 26.3% in 2035. Given that the overall scale of East Asia’s demand for natural gas vastly 
outstrips intraregional supplies and most countries in the region (except for China and Singapore) 
have no pipeline imports, the region has relied heavily on LNG imports to satisfy gas demand. In 
2015, 72% of globally traded LNG went to Asia, with the world’s top three LNG importers (i.e., 
Japan, South Korea, and China) residing in the region and importing 56.5% of globally traded 
LNG, despite a decline in gas imports in Japan and South Korea for the first time since 2009 [12]. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that Asia may absorb 80% of the incremental 
LNG imports over the medium term, with China alone absorbing 30% [13].  
This paper analyses the extent to which gas prices, trade and production in East Asia is 
influenced by world oil prices with particular focus on the current scenario of low oil prices. The 
paper argues that East Asia’s gas economics is different from standard economics due to East 
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Asia’s specific regional factors such as a prevailing gas-pricing mechanism, commercial practice, 
and national institutions. This distinctive economics and some sector-specific factors such as 
high capital intensity and long lead time provide a theoretical framework for assessing the effect 
of low oil prices on supply, demand and investments in natural gas in the East Asian region. 
Based on this hypothesised distinctive economics, a case study is employed to examine how low 
oil prices affect the gas sector using quantitative and quantitative research methods. The 
quantitative assessment is conducted using a world gas trading model. The study demonstrates 
that many market failures in the gas and LNG markets are explained by the proposed distinctive 
gas economics and associated sector-specific factors. This analytical framework coming from the 
distinctive economics provides a tool for policy makers and industry to assess policy options that 
can address these market failures .  
This research makes three major contributions. First, the proposal of the existence of distinctive 
gas economics in East Asia is new to the literature. This hypothesis provides an analytical 
framework to explain many unexpected behaviours and is useful for the gas and LNG industry 
and East Asian policy makers in understanding future market dynamics that are critical for their 
decisions in related to gas business and policies, relatively. Second, given that the global 
integration of gas markets is hypothesised to bring closer movement of regional prices, but the 
distinctive economics in the East Asian market has seen gas prices departing from those in the 
European and United States (US) markets, further study of the unique factors for the East Asian 
market can make important contributions to the literature. Third, it is the first simulation analysis 
of the effect of low oil prices on East Asia’s gas sector.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on debates in the East Asian gas 
market, and relationships between oil prices and the gas sector. Section 3 explains the 
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methodology, and proposes the distinctive gas economics of East Asia as an analytical 
framework to assess the effect of oil prices on the East Asian gas sector. Section 4 analyses 
qualitatively the effect of low oil prices on the gas sector according to the framework identified 
in Section 3. Section 5 presents a simulation analysis of a scenario of lower oil prices and the 
effect this would have on global gas production, trade and prices. The final section concludes the 
paper with a discussion of policy implications. 
2 Literature review 
The relationship between oil and gas prices is a long traditional topic in the literature. Ji et al [14] 
investigate a traditional issue in the oil and gas nexus: the co-integration of oil and gas prices in 
three major markets. The most popular tool for studying this relationship empirically is structural 
vector autoregression (VAR), for example, Jadidzadeh and Serletis [15]. The evolution of the 
literature often depends on the development of new economics techniques or the creation of 
more sophisticated data. For example, using a long dataset, a recent study [14] claims that oil and 
natural-gas prices may become decoupled, and that contrary to earlier research, natural gas may 
lead to crude-oil prices over a long sample. However, another recent study [16] uses a recently 
developed quantile autoregressive distributed lag (QARDL) model but yielded no new findings 
in the results. In addition, Brigida [17] allows multiple regimes when studying the co-integration 
relationship between natural-gas and crude-oil prices.  
Even in the recent literature, there is no consensus on the relationship between oil and gas prices. 
Many studies have found departures in the relationship between oil prices and gas prices in the 
US and Europe due to supply changes (either through newer production technologies or the 
commissioning of significant production capacity), technology improvements and changes in 
5 
contractual agreements. A recent analysis of Henry Hub prices and crude-oil prices with 
increased shale-gas production argued that the oil–gas long-term relationship ceased after 2009 
[18]. Erdos [19] investigates US and UK natural-gas prices and crude-oil prices, finding a 
decoupling phenomenon around 2009, and that natural-gas prices in the US and UK appear to be 
separate from each other. In addition, Ji et al [14] found that the oil-price shock is weak in North 
America, lags in Europe and is the most significant in Asia.  
In contrast, many researchers argue that the two prices remain interdependent. For example, 
Villar and Joutz [20] found a co-integration relationship between Henry Hub natural-gas prices 
and WTI crude-oil prices. Asche et al [21] found that European continental contracted gas prices 
are driven by oil prices, and that the new spot markets in Europe follow the same process of 
price determination as those in the UK gas market, meaning that all spot prices are determined 
by the oil price in the long term. However, this relationship is hypothesised to change due to start 
of US LNG exports, changes in price linkage in gas contracts and the development of spot 
trading in gas markets [1].  
Another group of studies observes a different relationship between oil and gas prices in the short 
and long term. Hartley et al [22] found that there are short-term departures from the long-term 
equilibrium between crude-oil prices and natural-gas prices. They argue that seasonal factors 
such as inventories, weather and supply shocks are the principal reasons for this short-term 
decoupling. Brigida [17] found that there exists a regime-switching mechanism, but that the 
prices of oil and gas are co-integrated and they faced a temporary shift rather than a permanent 
decoupling in the early 2000s. 
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While the dependence of natural-gas prices on oil prices in Europe and the US is weakening, this 
may not be the case in East Asia due to oil indexation. Therefore, it is important to simulate how 
the East Asian gas markets will respond to low oil prices. 
Most studies on East Asian gas-pricing issues focus on pricing mechanisms and associated 
contract arrangements. The IEA [13, 23] discusses how East Asia might achieve a transition 
from oil indexation to hub indexation. Stern [24] observes that oil-indexed gas pricing no longer 
reflects market fundamentals but East Asia has only begun to address the issue after 2011. 
Rogers and Stern [25] argue that Asian buyers should develop a price-formation mechanism that 
reflects their national or regional market fundamentals, a viewpoint that is similar to that of the 
IEA. Vivoda [26] evaluates the potential effect of Japan’s LNG strategy on regional pricing of 
gas in the broader institutional context. Shi and Variam [27] examine the effect of changes in 
indexation and contract terms in East Asia on world gas markets. Lin and Li [28] use a 
comprehensive econometrics framework to study regional segmentation and the different pricing 
mechanisms of natural gas. More broadly, there are discussions on the effect of future gas-
market integration on trade patterns and infrastructure [29]. Chang and Li [29] found that with an 
integrated and competitive regional natural-gas market, supply should come more from within 
the East Asian region, which allows cheaper transportation costs than the costs associated with 
sourcing from external suppliers that offer relatively cheap production and transportation costs. 
With the low oil prices after 2014, studies of the effect of low oil prices on natural-gas prices 
have been conducted but no study has performed a quantitative analysis including modelling 
simulation. Through quantitative scenario analysis, Rogers [30] explores the effect of lower oil 
and lower gas prices on existing and future gas and LNG projects, with an outlook for the period 
to 2030. Corbeau et al [31] conduct a comprehensive assessment of how low oil and gas prices 
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affect the world gas sector, with an emphasis on emerging gas markets. Shi [32] discusses how 
low oil prices might affect supply, demand, trade and investment in the Asia–Pacific gas sector. 
There are also several studies on the effect of high oil prices on natural-gas prices. For example, 
Barden et al [33] demonstrate that higher oil prices lead to a higher production and consumption 
of natural gas, which is contradictory to the usual expectation of low consumption, but this 
unusual behaviour was not investigated further. The simulation conducted in this paper 
demonstrates the likely future scenarios of the gas sector in a persistent scenario of low oil prices, 
and thus can help policy makers and industry to make policy decisions on investment and policy, 
respectively.  
Thus far, no study in the literature has considered how oil indexation will affect economic 
behaviour in the East Asian gas sector. Most studies in the literature focus on short-term price 
shocks. They neither study the effect of low oil prices nor the East Asian gas market. Despite the 
many studies on the relationship between oil prices and the gas market, there is a lack of research 
on the effect of long-term low oil prices on the natural-gas sector, and no explanation of how and 
why the gas market will respond to persistent low oil prices.  
3 Methodology: distinctive economics of the East Asian gas sector 
This paper argues that the economics of the East Asian gas markets are distinct from standard 
economic theory in which price is decided by the interaction between supply and demand. A case 
study of the effect of low oil prices on the East Asian gas sector is employed to test this 
hypothesis. The case study is conducted using qualitative and quantitative research methodology.  
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3.1 Computational modelling 
The quantitative simulation is conducted using the Nexant World Gas Model (WGM) [34]. The 
WGM is formulated as a linear program with minimisation of global gas-procurement costs 
(including production costs and transport costs) as the objective subject to technical constraints 
such as pipeline, LNG liquefaction and regasification capacity, storage capacity and their 
associated costs, as well as institutional constraints such as contract arrangements, destination 
restrictions and minimal ‘take-or-pay’ (TOP). The model includes all known sales contracts, 
including source and destination, annual contract quantity (ACQ), start and end dates, price 
formulae, and active and planned infrastructure. It also includes essential variables such as 
seasonal-demand variations, supply swing and storage capacities (working volume and 
deliverability). The historical data are available for 2006 to 2014 and the outlook period is up to 
2035. In the model, trade LNG and gas prices are linked to certain benchmark prices. In East 
Asia, the benchmark price is oil price, which reflects the exogenous pricing of traded gas. The 
model outlook does not consider the East Asian gas hub pricing that is emerging. Readers who 
are interested with the effect of hub pricing may refer to two recent studies [27, 35].  For more 
details of the model and model assumptions, please refer to several recent studies [35-37]. 
3.2 Qualitative analytical framework 
As stated, the economics of the East Asian gas market are distinct from standard market 
economics in that gas prices are exogenously set from market supply and demand. In standard 
economic theory, gas prices will be endogenously determined by supply and demand—a fall in 
gas prices will stimulate gas demand and discourage gas supply and thus create a market 
shortage or a gap. The gap will force the gas market to be rebalanced at a new equilibrium, with 
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a higher price level. In contrast, in increase in gas prices will reduce demand and increase supply 
and thus rebalance the gas market at a lower price level. However, prices of most traded natural 
gas (both through pipeline and LNG) in East Asia are indexed to oil prices. Gas prices are 
typically calculated at a rate of 12 to 15% (in the unit of MMBTU) of the oil price per barrel [38]. 
Given that the market fundamentals of the oil and gas markets are different, the oil-indexation 
price mechanism would not necessary lead to equilibrium in the gas markets [13].  
The time lag in the oil-indexed gas-pricing formula further deviates the gas prices from the 
contemporary market fundamentals. The oil-indexed gas prices will often have a time lag 
reported at approximately four to eight months [39], or even six and 12 months [9]. In a time lag 
of this length, changes in gas market fundamentals will often not be reflected in traded gas prices. 
This divergence has been particularly serious during the past two years when oil prices have 
slumped. This serious divergence in crashing oil prices mean that India and Qatar must rework 
the pricing formula for LNG trade [40].  
The S-curve1 further encourages suppliers to ignore market equilibrium prices because producers 
will be guaranteed a floor price during a period of low oil prices. The S-curve’s price formulae 
are common in current gas contracts, which set floor prices and ceiling reference oil prices. 
Moreover, the long-term contract practice and the TOP obligation in East Asia’s gas trade distort 
demand for import to respond to world prices and further deviate the gas economics of East Asia 
from the standard economic theory. East Asian pipeline gas and LNG are often traded with 10-
year and even longer term contracts. According to the latest report from the International Group 
                                                 
1  The S-curve is defined by its slope (LNG price relative to reference oil price). The slope becomes flat where the 
oil price is above and below a certain oil price to dampen the effect of high oil prices on the buyer, and low oil 
prices on the seller. 
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of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL), gas trade in 2015 with contract terms above four 
years accounts for 72% of the global traded LNG [12]. Terms in these LNG contracts reflect the 
status of the market at the time of negotiation, but not the time of delivery. While some contracts 
can reopen terms every few years, there is a lack of flexibility to handle the short-term market 
conditions. Therefore, the long-term contracts often deviate from current and future market 
fundamentals. The deviation is often unilateral: long-term gas-contract prices are often (except in 
very tight markets) the ceiling for hub prices because otherwise, either high nomination or more 
spot trading will occur to restrain the hub prices [30]. 
Further, the TOP obligations put a floor on gas import volume. The TOP liability requires that 
buyers pay for a minimum volume such that the specified volume of gas must be purchased 
regardless of demand. The TOP transit’s volume risks to downstream buyers which guarantee the 
volume of supply even the market equilibrium supply should be lower. The commercial practice 
of long-term contracts and TOP help to explain why the number of proposed projects still far 
exceeded the demands of likely customers in a low-price period [41]. 
Finally, because of some national institutional settings, low oil and gas prices in the international 
markets may not be able to channel to domestic consumers and therefore undermine demand 
response. One key national institutional setting is price control in the final markets, which limits 
the effect of low gas prices on gas consumption. According to an International Gas Union (IGU) 
[6] report, approximately 35% of global gas consumption in 2014 was under various regulated 
prices.2 Most of the East Asian domestic gas market is vertically integrated or even monopolised 
                                                 
2  Meanwhile, the share of consumption under gas-on-gas competition prices and oil indexed prices was 43 and 
17%.  
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[13]. A monopolised gas market most likely prevents the transition of low international gas 
prices to domestic gas and electricity markets. Despite declining gas prices, East Asian demand 
has not been boosted, but rather has decreased in some areas [32].  
Regulation of domestic gas prices is another factor that prevents the channel of low international 
prices to domestic consumers and thus discourages market response to low prices. In many East 
Asian countries, domestic gas prices are regulated by the government [13]. For example, the 
regulated prices in China fail to keep pace with market dynamics [35]. In contrast, the dramatic 
decline of global oil prices has resulted in low prices for gas alternatives and thus the gas 
demand in China in 2015 was lower than expected by the majority of the market players [12]. 
Globally, despite the decline in oil prices, IEA revised down the natural-gas demand outlook in 
its 2015 Medium-term Gas Market Report [42].  
Some sectoral characteristics distort the East Asian gas market from standard economic theory. 
The capital-intensive nature and long lead time imply that the supply will not reflect current 
market fundamentals. Gas projects (LNG projects in particular) are capital intensive, which 
means they have low variable (operational) costs and thus low shutdown prices for gas exports. 
This means producers will usually not shut down production as long as operating costs are 
covered. Therefore, natural-gas extraction from fields will continue despite prices being below 
the full cost incurred by off-takers.3 Further, the long lead time of gas projects causes delay of 
supply response to price signals. Short-term price swings are unlikely to have a strong effect on 
new investments that will take five or 10 years to come online. A recent example is that the UK’s 
                                                 
3  Australia’s LNG from coalbed methane will be exceptional because these plants have extremely high ongoing 
operational costs due to the need to drill hundreds of wells every year to maintain feed-gas production. 
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biggest deep-water fields, the Laggan Tormore project, had started production in February 2016 
[43]. The capital-intensive characteristic of LNG industry prevents supply to response to market 
in lower price  cases. The factors that cause the distinctive gas economics are summarised in 
Table 1.  
Table 1 Framework for analysis of economics of East Asian gas markets 
Pricing mechanism Oil indexation: gas prices are determined by oil prices and thus will not 
reflect the gas-market fundamentals 
Oil indexed gas price is set with significant time lag from oil prices and 
thus will not reflect current market fundamentals  
Pricing formula: the S-curve will fix prices in extreme cases 
Commercial practice Long-term contracts: these do not reflect current and future 
fundamentals  
Minimum TOP level places a floor on gas import volume causing 
supply inflexibility 
National institutions Monopolised market, and regulated wholesale or retailing prices 






Low variable costs and high capital costs cause low shutdown prices 
Long lead 
times  
Projects were decided long ago and thus cannot respond to current 
market fundamental changes 
 
4 Qualitative assessment of East Asia’s gas markets in period of low oil prices  
Based on the distinctive gas-market economics in East Asia presented in Section 3, East Asia 
will more directly feel the effect of low oil prices on natural gas than will the US and Europe. 
The distinctive economics of the East Asian gas markets will cause a persistence of lower gas 
prices in a low-oil-price regime that is driven primarily by inflexible contractual terms in an 
anticipated over-supplied market in the context of predominantly oil-indexed gas prices. Oil 
indexation will lead to lower LNG and gas prices when oil prices are low. By intuition, as well as 
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using economic theory, it can be expected that the price drop will discourage supply. However, 
despite lower-than-equilibrium gas prices, the supply shortage may not occur in the short to 
medium term. Due to these special market economics, the East Asian LNG market will continue 
have a supply glut until at least 2020.  
4.1 Supply side 
Although many market players have expressed concern that low gas prices could disrupt gas 
supplies in the medium to long term due to lack of investment, few market players expect that 
the LNG glut will disappear, at least not before 2020. For example, the IEA believes that global 
LNG export capacity will increase by more than 40% by 2020, with 90% of the additional export 
capacity coming from Australia and the US [42]. The gas-supply glut is particularly relevant to 
the East Asian LNG market because most of the planned LNG development projects are in 
Australia and Papua New Guinea, which could introduce approximately 90 bcm of new supply 
per year to the market [9].  
Several factors could contribute to an ongoing glut despite low gas prices. First, the projects that 
have already received final investment decision (FID) and are under construction are unlikely to 
be ceased. These sites will come online over the next few years because large portions of their 
volume are usually committed to buyers. A considerable number of liquefaction projects in 
Australia and the US are already under construction and will go ahead despite low gas prices, 
which will add to the LNG supply glut up until 2020 [44]. In Australia alone, 14.4 million tonnes 
per annum (mtpa) of new production capacity has been added to the market and 42 mtpa are 
expected to come on stream in 2016 [12]. In the US, gas prices are relatively independent from 
oil prices, and the US Energy Information Administration forecasts that US natural-gas 
production growth will rise from late 2016 to 2017 despite current low gas prices [45].  
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Second, the new business model in LNG liquefaction terminals will also boost LNG export 
despite low oil and gas prices. The new players that are building, or proposing to build, LNG 
export projects in the US and Canada are not traditional players and have access to the requisite 
technology and financing.4 Given that tolling fees have been committed for a long period and 
thus become sunk costs, exporters may continue export, at least for a short term without recovery 
of the sunk investment costs. These players will produce the majority of incremental LNG in the 
next 10 years if they can overcome and absorb their own financial strains. However, not all 
proposed LNG projects in the US will begin exporting LNG in their initial planned periods, 
which will slightly alleviate the supply glut. The TOP obligations delink supply from prices and 
further contribute to the supply glut. This means that sellers must produce gas at the minimum 
required levels and take on the added risk of low prices.  
Third, the resilience of the gas sector, including shale gas, will add pressure to the world gas 
markets. The cost of production for gas projects is flexible and could be reduced with low prices 
for reasons that include capital restructuring, management improvement, and technology 
innovation [46]. Capital costs for production and exports could be reduced by using floating 
LNG facilities, introducing competition into liquefaction processes, synergies by share of costs, 
and simplifying the engineering design stage [30]. Further, technology innovations could reduce 
the production costs of gas and thus boost supply in lower prices. It has been reported that 
drilling efficiencies and well performance have been improved in the US, which reduces the unit 
cost of gas production [31]. The effect of low oil prices on shale-gas activities in particular could 
be weaker than many observers anticipated. For example, the US Energy Information Agency 
                                                 
4  US LNG exports are supplied by independent companies—not international oil companies and national oil 
companies—and operate under tolling models. 
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(EIA) projects that production of shale gas will increases in the situation of high and low oil 
prices [46]. The Chinese shale-gas sector is also somewhat insulated from low international 
prices due to regulation that sets China netback prices5 at a floor of US$6/MMBTU. The 
participation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) add power to weather the price storm because 
SOEs are less sensitive to declining profits than are private companies. Even amid the lower gas 
prices, China will continue its efforts to develop shale gas and coalbed methane to improve its 
energy security, employment rates and efforts in technological innovation. Nevertheless, the 
supply of conventional gas may still come under pressure due to reduced gas prices and the 
increasing amount of LNG and pipeline-gas imports. 
Fourth, the entrance of new players, such as private and non-oil and gas players,  into the oil and 
gas market, and the investment from these new players, could mitigate some investment 
reduction from existing oil and gas companies. The retreat of oil and gas majors could make 
room for new players to enter projects or areas where they were previously disadvantaged. The 
lower asset value makes traditional oil and gas projects more affordable to many investors, both 
inside and outside the oil and gas industry. Oil and gas companies from importing countries such 
as China, India, Japan and Thailand will have an opportunity to acquire and develop LNG for 
their domestic markets under attractive terms and may partially fill the gap created by reduced 
activities from international oil companies [47]. For example, Baosteel, a major Chinese steel 
company, two Chinese insurers, and a number of funds were allowed to acquire stakes in three 
pipelines that were owned by China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), which has lost revenue 
due to the oil-price drop [48]. In March 2016, a private Chinese oil and gas company announced 
                                                 
5  The netback price is the city-gate price to the gas producer, which is based on the market price minus charges for 
delivering the gas to market. 
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its bid to take over Bankers Petroleum Ltd in a deal worth C$575 million [49]. Both examples 
indicate a trend that many private Chinese companies consider this low-price period an 
opportunity to acquire overseas oil and gas assets [50]. 
However, over the medium and long term, gas supply will be undermined due to reduced or 
delayed investment. Many more companies will have to reduce their investments in new natural-
gas and LNG projects due to difficulty in accessing capital, regardless of the investment value of 
these projects. With lower oil or gas prices, companies will logically cut capital expenditures and 
refocus on lower cost assets, despite the slight possibility of counter-cycle investment.6 
According to a report from Bain & Company published in November 2015 [51], the oil and gas 
industry deferred or cancelled US$200 billion worth of planned investments over the past two 
years and another US$1.5 trillion of future spending due to calculations that these projects might 
not be economically viable given oil prices at that time. 
Further, market volatility and low gas prices will make it difficult to begin new projects. Industry 
analysts have observed that an FID for large greenfield projects in high-cost areas such as 
Australia and Canada is likely to be postponed or permanently cancelled, whereas FID for 
projects in relatively low-cost areas such as the US is likely to continue [44].  
4.2 Demand side 
Given that the supply of natural gas is unlikely to change in the short term and the glut is 
expected to continue until at least 2020, generating new demand for gas will be necessary to 
                                                 
6  However, counter-cycle investment could occur to help prepare for a future rebound in prices. A prominent past 
example is the go-ahead decision on Gorgon LNG made in 2009 after the oil-price crash (see Stoppard 2015).  
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rebalance the market. Despite relatively rigid market demand in East Asian countries, low oil 
prices can provide a stimulus for demand for at least three reasons. First, low-cost LNG will 
cause increased demand from some LNG-importing countries. For example, the low-price of 
LNG makes natural gas competitive in India’s power sector. In 2015, India recorded high LNG 
imports, and its imports in 2017 are expected to be double the 2010 levels [52].  
Second, low LNG prices will push the development of new markets to new destinations (e.g., 
Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Jamaica, Pakistan, the Philippines, Panama, South Africa and Vietnam) 
that are sensitive to prices. These markets have been or will be developed and will help offset the 
supply glut [41]. The emergence of new technologies and infrastructure has enabled 
breakthrough into these new markets, which often cannot afford the immense scale and costs 
associated with natural-gas infrastructure. For example, floating LNG terminals could provide a 
low capital cost (but not a low operational cost) solution for LNG importers in these less 
developed countries. Egypt, Jordan and Pakistan began to import LNG through floating terminals 
in 2015. Nevertheless, technological innovation may not be sufficient to generate new demand. 
For example, to develop the natural-gas sector further in less credit-worthy emerging economies, 
LNG developers may also need to provide credit and investment support in downstream 
infrastructure [41]. 
Third, expanding the use of LNG in the transportation sector is another option for further 
utilising a seeming overabundance of viable natural-gas resources. For example, only a 10% 
switch of transport fuels to gas globally would create demand for 70 million tonnes of LNG 
equivalent (an amount that is similar to Japan’s LNG imports and represent 30% of global LNG 
trade in 2015) [53]. While low oil prices enable LNG to compete more widely with coal, they 
will reduce the incentive for gas-to-oil substitution in the transport sector.  
18 
As the IEA predicts, low natural-gas import prices could turn gas into an increasingly attractive 
option from an environmental standpoint [42]. The demand for cleaner air, which is seen in 
China and India, could be a significant driver of natural-gas demand given that natural gas 
produces fewer emissions per unit of energy than coal. According to recent data from the World 
Health Organization, 56 of the top 60 globally polluted cities (in terms of particulate matter 2.5) 
are located in Asia, and most of these cities are in either China or India [54]. Natural gas is the 
immediate solution to replace coal and can help reduce air pollution in these countries.  
In the long term, the 2015 United Nations Conference on Climate Change (COP21) could 
provide the necessary momentum to spur natural-gas development due to the growing global 
consensus and push towards cleaner energy sources. According to a recent IEA report, coal 
combustion generates more than 40% of carbon dioxide emissions despite constituting only 
approximately 30% of the total primary energy supply [55]. Given that natural gas has 
approximately half the emissions intensity of coal, a shift from coal to natural gas could be an 
immediate strategy to meet COP21 targets without limiting the energy needed for economic 
growth, particularly for developing countries. However, in the short term, low oil and gas prices 
could worsen the level of emissions as fossil fuels gain cost competitiveness over alternatives.  
5 Simulation of effect of low oil prices on East Asian gas markets  
To test the effect of low oil prices on the natural-gas sector, we conducted simulation exercises 
using the Nexant WGM [34]. In this model, the specified demand for each node (some countries 
may have more than one node) is exogenously forecasted based on economic growth, energy 
intensity and population growth at a sectoral level. Supply data by field is included as a cost 
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curve for the producing country. Oil prices are used to derive gas prices under long-term gas 
contracts (oil-indexed contracts) into Europe and Asia.7 Given that contracted gas prices are 
linked to oil prices, the demand may not be met and thus leave a gap between demand and 
consumption in a low-oil-price period because of insufficient production resulting from low 
prices. The results are presented as a difference between the policy scenario and the baseline 
scenario. Shi and Variam [27] provides a detailed explanation of the model, the regional 
classification, key assumptions and inputs, and the baseline scenario. 
5.1 Baseline scenario 
The baseline scenario is developed as a reference case to study how the international gas market 
might evolve to 2035. The original oil prices assumption was taken from IEA and World Bank 
price projections.  
In the baseline scenario, global gas production and consumption is projected to increase from 
3550 bcm in 2015 to 4860 bcm in 2035, with a compound annual growth rate of 1.6% (Figure 1). 
LNG exports will grow faster than pipeline exports, signifying the great potential of LNG export 
growth. Global LNG exports will grow 3.6% per year from 330 bcm in 2015 to 670 bcm in 2035. 
In contrast, pipeline-gas trade increases at a moderate 1.9% per year from 2020 bcm in 2015 to 
2920 bcm in 2035. 
Natural-gas spot prices are expected to decrease from 2015 to approximately 2020, in line with a 
decline in oil prices, before rising steadily to original price levels at approximately 
                                                 
7  Specifically, the Japan Crude Cocktail is often used as a benchmark for LNG contracts, particularly in the Far 
East, and high sulphur fuel oil price is the benchmark for pricing gas contracts in Europe. 
20 
US$10/MMBTU in Asia and Europe. Asian prices are generally higher than European and North 
American gas prices (Figure 2).  
Figure 1 World natural-gas production in baseline scenario (bcm) 
Source: model results 
Figure 2 Spot gas prices in key markets in baseline scenario (US$/MMBTU) 
 










































5.2 Effect of persistent low oil prices 
As we are creating an illustrative case and for the sake of simplicity, in the simulation of the 
effect of low oil prices, we assume a low oil price of US$30/barrel across the study period. The 
oil-prices assumption in the baseline and in the low-oil-price scenarios are presented in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 Oil-price assumption: baseline v. low-oil-price scenario 
 
Source: Model assumptions 
 
From the simulation, the largest effect of low oil prices is observed in the production and 
consequently, the consumption of natural gas. Due to the low prices for oil-indexed gas and LNG 
exports, there is a decline in the production due to a shut-in of higher cost fields. The low oil 
prices discourage production and thus leave a significant gap between demand and 
consumption.8 On the supply side, production from North America, Russia, the Middle East and 
                                                 
8 The forecasted natural-gas demand is different from realised consumption. Demand is an input to the model and 
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Australia declines. On the demand side, the Middle East, the OECD, China and Southeast Asia 
experience a fall in consumption (Figure 4). Science demand is exogenously set and will not 
change with lower oil prices, some demand will not be met due to lower production, thus 
creating shortage when compared to the baseline scenario.  
 
Figure 4 Natural-gas production and consumption in bcm, baseline  v. low-oil-price scenario  
  
 
Low oil prices make US LNG more expensive than Asian buyers’ expectations and thus, 
less attractive to these buyers. LNG exports from North American to Japan and Korea will be 
reduced in the largest amount of all the destinations (Figure 5). However, earlier developed LNG 
export facilities such as Cheniere’s Sabine Pass LNG and Freeport LNG are less affected by low 
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gas prices given that they are already fully contracted [56]. Nevertheless, US LNG may be in 
demand for other reasons (e.g., supply security and diversification, flexibility from destination 
clauses, liquidity of spot markets, and non-oil-linked pricing). This part of US LNG demand will 
not likely be affected by low gas prices. This is reflected in the steady contracted US LNG 
exports to China and India in the low-oil-price scenario, where supply is taken up to TOP level in 
both the baseline scenario and the low-oil-price scenario.  
 
Figure 5 North American LNG export in bcm: low-oil-price scenario v. baseline scenario 
 
Source: simulation results. 
 
The adverse effect on North American LNG exports is due to the different price mechanisms. 
Given that the North American gas prices are independent from oil prices, the low oil prices will 
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prices remain at the US$2 level, the US LNG cost, insurance, and freight prices to Japan will be 
at least US$6.5 per MMBTU given the prevailing tolling fee of liquefaction (currently between 
US$2.37 and US$3 per MMBTU [57]) and freight (another US$2–3 per MMBTU, including boil 
off) [44].9  
The US may become the swing LNG producer and put a ceiling on world LNG prices in the 
future. The competitiveness of US LNG could change either if oil prices increase to above 
US$60 a barrel or US LNG export costs are reduced through technical and financial innovations. 
When oil prices are above US$60 a barrel, US LNG will be competitive with LNG in Asia based 
on Japanese customs-cleared crude prices.  
As expected, the behaviour of the oil-indexed Australian LNG exports is different from that of 
the hub-indexed US LNG exports due to the difference in pricing mechanisms (Figure 4). 
Australian exports are largely unchanged, except those to consumer countries in Southeast Asia 
(i.e. Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore), where low oil prices make the Southeast Asian LNG 
more attractive to local consumers. Australian LNG even gains market in Japan and Korea by 
replacing North American LNG (spot sales). The Middle East LNG shows a similar pattern to 
that of Australia, except that exports are diverted from India to Africa.  
 
 
Figure 6 LNG exports from Australia and  the Middle East in bcm (low-oil-price v. baseline 
scenario) 
                                                 
9  Transactions used on a cost, insurance, and freight basis mean that the price includes all costs of transporting the 
goods from the point-of-origin to the destination.  
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Source: simulation results 
All the major gas spot prices will be reduced in the low-oil-price scenario (Figure 7). The 
prices (apart from the Henry Hub and National Balance Point (NBP) prices) are lower because 
their oil-indexed nature. The representative hub prices (Henri Hub and UK) are also lower due to 
the competition from the other lower prices gas in the market.  
 
Figure 7 Spot prices: low-oil-price v. baseline scenario  in US$/MMBTU 
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6 Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper examined the implications of oil indexation in the East Asian gas sector and identified 
the distinctiveness of East Asian gas economics from standard economic theory, which holds that 
the interaction between supply and demand determines prices. Given abundant gas resources, 
growing demand, and the need to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions created by the use of fossil 
fuels, there are strong incentives—and needs—to ensure continued development of natural gas as 
an attractive low-emissions source of fossil fuel. Today’s prolonged period of low oil prices has 
had a massive effect on natural-gas markets, particularly in the East Asia, where it plays a 
significant role in the energy mix of many countries in the region.  
The economics of East Asia’s gas sector has some characteristics that distinguish it from 
standard economics. The most distinctive factor is the exogenous determination of gas prices. 
That is, traded gas prices in the region are driven by oil prices due to the dominance of oil-
indexed and long-term contracts. Other sector-specific factors such as its capital-intensive nature, 
and long lead time also contribute to the distinctive economic factors affecting the East Asian 
natural-gas market.  
This distinctive economics causes some unique behaviour in the East Asian gas markets in a 
period of low oil prices. While low oil and low gas prices have created turbulence in global 
markets, the oversupply of natural gas in East Asia is unlikely to change in the short term, and 
the glut is expected to continue until at least 2020. This short-term inflexibility in supply is due 
to TOP arrangements, high capital requirements for projects, and long lead times for project 
development. In the medium to long term, delayed or reduced investment for new projects 
because of present lower prices and supply abundance could disrupt the gas supply. 
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On the demand side, low gas prices will increase the consumption of natural gas in existing 
markets—a trend that will be accelerated by the global momentum to combat climate change—
along with new markets that will be developed due to cost attractiveness. Low gas prices also 
create the essential environment to drive innovations to reduce costs and open new markets. 
However, the demand response is often limited by a distortion of domestic prices that prevents 
low international prices from being channelled to end users. Additionally, weakening coal prices 
will cause competition among resources and can potentially depress demand for gas. While 
uncertain factors such as oil prices, Chinese demand and COP21 will shape the future of the gas 
industry, one key determining factor is cost competitiveness between coal and gas in local 
markets.  
The simulations reveal that lower oil prices would lead to overall lower global gas prices, which 
discourages investment and thus leads to a significant supply shortage in the long term because 
gas prices are linked to oil prices and thus cannot respond to a shortage in the gas markets. Low 
oil prices make US LNG less attractive to their global buyers. In contrast, Australia and Middle 
East LNG gain market by replacing North American LNG.  
Although total investment will be depressed, some structural changes could contribute to 
rebalancing the gas markets in the medium to long term. The retreat of current market players 
makes room for new oil and gas companies—even non-oil and gas companies—and financial 
investors to enter the gas sector. The fact that traditional oil companies are transitioning to the 
gas business is also a positive momentum for the industry.  
The current low oil and gas prices have affected trade dynamics in many ways. They have helped 
phase out destination restrictions, reduced the attractiveness of US LNG, and facilitated market 
liberalisation in East Asia.  
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The paper has demonstrated that the distinctive economics related to the gas market in East Asia 
may cause market failure, and the gas market in this region will not be cleared in a low-oil-price 
scenario. In this scenario, producers will struggle to find markets to which to sell their gas, and 
consumers will struggle to find supply with prices that are competitive with gas alternatives. The 
analytical framework based on the distinctive economics of the East Asian gas market provides a 
tool for policy makers and industry to assess and search for policy options that address this 
market failure.  
Specifically, this paper could lead to the following policy implications:  
• Investment in the natural-gas sector should be better coordinated over time to avoid 
supply disruption. Further liberalisation of markets is needed to attract different investors 
and other players (e.g. financial institutes) that can help mitigate market volatility.  
• Additional demand for natural gas should be developed either through creating new 
markets or by boosting consumption in existing markets to rebalance and develop a 
sustainable and robust natural-gas sector in East Asia and globally. Development of new 
markets not only creates a demand to solve the supply glut, but also mitigates carbon 
dioxide emissions from energy use. In the existing markets, extending the use of gas to 
the transport sector could also be a means of meeting the often-contradictory needs of 
creating energy and reducing pollutants and carbon dioxide emissions.  
• The transition of pricing mechanisms from oil indexation to hub pricing should be 
advanced even in in the low-price period. While there is an indication that Asian buyers 
do not feel a great sense of urgency in initiating such a transition, the market failures due 
to exogenously pricing demonstrates the need of hub pricing.  
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• East Asia needs to accelerate gas market liberalization and hub building to improve 
market sustainability. While a regional LNG spot market may provide much needed 
benchmark prices, the lack of liberalization will delay the pricing transition process in 
domestic markets, which will further discourage the optimal utilization of gas.  
• The buyers should take advantage of the low oil price that diminishes the gap between 
oil-indexed prices and hub prices. Changing the pricing mechanism in a low-price period 
will not cause a significant shock to buyers and sellers because the difference between 
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